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Abstract. Organizational and sociological research dealing with network governance has 
mainly focused on network advantages rather than on their problems or dysfunctionalities. This 
left partially unexplored the field of network failure. Even if some early attempts at explicitly 
theorizing network failures have been made, we argue that explanations based mainly on social 
conditions (ignorance and opportunism) offered by this emerging theory (e.g. Schrank and 
Whitford, 2011), are not exhaustive. In this article we report the results of our empirical 
investigation on the underperforming network between the worldwide famous Venice Film 
Festival and its local hospitality system (in Venice, Italy). In the case study we are presenting, 
we will show how institutions have not been able to inhibit opportunism and sustain trust 
among network members because of mobilizing practices developed across formal lines of 
communication. With this work we propose a dynamic theory of network failure, answering to 
the more general call for network theories to focus the attention on agency and micro-
processes. 
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"Shouldn’t the oldest and arguably most prestigious  
film festival in the world be running like a well-oiled  
machine at this point – even though it’s in Italy?  
 To be blunt, it’s not. From an organizational point of view,  
it’s a creaky mass of disconnected parts." 
Variety 2002 
  
 
Introduction 
Motivated in part by networks’ increased empirical evidence and in part by the challenge 
represented by some economic views of organization (M. Granovetter, 1985), economic 
sociologists and organizational scholars have put a strong emphasis on the functionalities of 
networks. More specifically, literature has provided evidence concerning (1) under which 
circumstances networks are the most efficient and effective organizational form − e.g. unstable 
demand, dispersed and rapidly changing knowledge, etc. (Smith-Doerr & Powell, 2005); (2) 
what the main mechanisms are that sustain network governance − e.g. trust (Susan  Helper, 
MacDuffie, & Sabel, 2000; Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1997), reputation and reciprocity (Kogut, 
1989; Powell, 1990; Williamson, 1991), information transfer and learning, (Larson, 1992), 
joint problem-solving arrangements (Uzzi, 1997), reciprocal lines of communication (Powell, 
1990; Smith-Doerr & Powell, 2005); (3) which structural characteristics are linked under 
certain circumstances to superior outcomes − e.g. the strength of weak ties (M. S. Granovetter, 
1973), the presence of structural holes (Burt, 2004), etc.1 
                                                
1 In particular, two main approaches can be identified within research on organizational networks: the 
"network analytical approach" and the "network as a form of governance" approach (Provan & Kenis, 
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Despite their well-known functionalities, networks also fail. This has important 
consequences for intra- and inter-firm value creation processes. However, it is only recently 
that scholars have started searching for and analyzing the causes that prevent the formation of 
networks or make coordination through networks inefficient2.  
From a structuralist point of view, an important contribution to the analysis of a specific 
type of network failure is provided by the work of Burt (1999) on the dark side of networks, in 
which the author highlights how structural holes theory and theories of cohesion focused only 
on benefits of network positioning, overlooking the possible detrimental effects on trust of 
third parties. At the same time, from a functionalist point of view, there is a growing theory of 
network failure that goes beyond the dark side and closer to the idea of network imperfections 
(Podolny & Page, 1998; Schrank & Whitford, 2011). As Schrank and Whitford note “while 
sociologists tend to portray networks as a mode of transactional governance that is akin to − 
rather than an admixture of − markets and hierarchies, they have made no systematic effort to 
                                                                                                                                                     
2008). The most relevant stream of research within the former is the Social Network Analysis (SNA), 
whose distinctive traits are (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003): i) its focus on relations and the patterns of relations 
rather than on attributes of actors; ii) the amenability to multiple levels of analysis; iii) the possible 
integration between quantitative, qualitative, and graphical data, for thorough and in-depth analysis. 
Scholars have especially contributed to the structural analysis of networks, using concepts such as 
centrality, density, and structural holes (Burt, 1999).  On the other hand, the second approach focuses 
on networks as mechanisms of coordination (Provan & Kenis, 2008), treating networks as the unit of 
analysis. During the last decades this stream of research has been characterized by a long debate about 
considering networks as a mere hybrid between markets and hierarchies (Williamson, 1975) or as a 
distinct form of governance (Powell, 1990), almost concluded with the acknowledgement of the 
network organization as a "unique alternative possessing its own logic" (Podolny & Page, 1998; Powell, 
1990).  
2 Studies on market and hierarchy failures, on the other hand, have a long-standing tradition (see for 
example, Bator (1958), Meyer and Zucker, (1989) . 
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relate theories of network functioning to an understanding of the sources of network stillbirth 
and mortality, let alone to the conditions under which network governance persists despite poor 
performance.” (Schrank & Whitford, 2011, p. 153).  
In this paper we argue that to improve our understanding of network failure we need to 
push forward the theoretical agenda answering the more general call for network theories 
towards the study of network dynamics and micro-processes (Ahuja, Soda, & Zaheer, 2012) 
and of the role individual agency plays in them (Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000). 
We developed an explorative case study of the network, in the city of Venice (Italy), 
between the local hospitality system and the world-famous Venice Film Festival (“La 
Biennale” organization). In this setting, for years attempts to solve coordination and 
cooperation problems through network governance have been made, without success. Through 
our empirical analysis we explore why local institutions, such as business associations, have 
not been able to sustain trust and cooperation among the network, and we provide a detailed 
description of why and how network governance did not work in the specific case. 
Empirical evidence was gathered through the study of archival data of La Biennale 
Cinema covering 80 years, a press review spanning ten years, eighteen in-depth interviews 
with the principal stakeholders, and two sessions of non-participant observation. Our unit of 
analysis were behaviors of individuals acting as agents of organizations.  
Our results highlight the importance to complement theory of network failure with the 
consideration of network micro-processes and individuals' agency, in order to improve our 
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understanding of this specific network outcome.  
In the next section, we present our theoretical background. We then present the methods, 
data gathering process and analysis, and the empirical findings. We then discuss our main 
results, and conclude the paper with final remarks and suggestions for potential future 
developments of research in the field of network failure. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Network failure 
 
While theories of market and organizational failure have been significantly developed in 
past years (Powell, 1990; Williamson, 1985), late recognition of the network as a distinct form 
of governance has caused a delay in the advancement of a theory of network failure (Diani, 
2011). In fact, if from a purely structural perspective the trichotomy among market, hierarchy 
and network is a false one (Podolny & Page, 1998), as a form of governance it has its 
distinctive characteristics, which make it more than a mere hybrid between market and 
hierarchy. Considering the long debate between TCE's supporters and Powell's followers 
concluded, the literature moved toward treating networks as discrete forms of governance, 
characterizing them as having unique structural features, coordination mechanisms, bases of 
legitimacy, etc. (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003; Powell, 1990; Provan & Kenis, 2008).  
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The network organization is described by scholars as a non-hierarchical form of 
governance, which functions on trust, reciprocity, and social capital, and in which interaction is 
based on informality and lack of formal boundaries (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2011). Networks, as 
defined by Powell (1990), are those forms of exchange rooted in sociality, in which 
transactions are based on “relationships, mutual interests, and reputation” (Powell, 1990). In 
Podolny and Page's (1998) terms, a network form of organization can be defined as "any 
collection of actors (N > 2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another 
and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve 
disputes that may arise during the exchange" (Podolny & Page, 1998, p. 59).  
Such a form of governance is desirable in those organizational fields (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983) characterized by specific environmental factors3. Taking as a reference point the 
transactional conditions that make governance mechanisms potentially effective and efficient 
(M. Granovetter, 1985; Williamson, 1975), the stylized environment for network forms of 
governance is characterized by high levels of uncertainty, in which demand is unstable, 
knowledge and technologies are rapidly evolving and changing, and complex 
interdependencies among agents are present (McEvily & Marcus, 2005; Schrank & Whitford, 
2011).  
                                                
3 Environmental factors can be used to define different scope conditions  for the three stylized 
alternative modes of governance  – markets, hierarchies and networks (Schrank & Whitford, 2011). 
Even though the consideration of the three alternatives as stand-alone forms of governance has 
significant limitations – especially as far as the analysis of mixed forms is concerned (Grandori, 1997) – 
this does not affect our discussion. 
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Network failure, paralleling market and hierarchy's definitions (Bator, 1958; Meyer & 
Zucker, 1989), can be defined as "the failure of a more or less idealized set of relational-
network institutions to sustain “desirable” activities or to impede “undesirable” activities" 
(Schrank & Whitford, 2011, p. 155). Such a broad definition allows to consider all different 
types of failure: from the easiest to detect, when a network terminates, to other types of partial 
failures, when networks are not able to reach the goals for which they started. In particular, 
considering organizational fields in which network would be the optimal form of governance, 
failure in absolute terms verifies when networks disappear or fail to form even in the presence 
of the ideal environmental factors (Schrank & Whitford, 2011)4. Networks failing in relative 
terms persist in a condition of underperformance, without devolving necessarily to markets or 
hierarchies. A first important stream of research investigating a specific type of relative failure 
is that about the dark side of networks (Burt, 1999; Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000), which focuses 
on the possible negative effects of network structure on managerial and entrepreneurial 
processes. Notwithstanding the relevance of this approach to the understanding of network 
failure, the call made to network scholars regarding the necessity of bringing back individuals 
in network analysis seems pertinent also in this domain (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003, p. 114). The 
focus on individuals' agency allows to take into consideration that network participants can 
engage in processes of ties formation and management (Vissa, 2012), creating network 
                                                
4 Granovetter (1985) criticizes Williamson (1975) for a similar approach to the “prediction” of optimal 
forms of governance: he prefers to adopt a lighter definition, writing about “pressures” towards a form 
of governance, “to avoid the functionalism implicit in Williamson’s assumption that whatever 
organizational form is most efficient, will be the one observed” (Granovetter, 1985, p. 503). 
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structures that can benefit them (Ahuja, et al., 2012), thus altering the initial network structure 
associated to some specific (dis)advantages. For instance, the structural holes theory predicts 
advantages for agents with some specific ego-network structures (Burt, 1992), yet a 
consideration of agency activity by alters suggests that (under specific conditions) they could 
plug up structural holes, eliminating any advantages ego would have had from that structure 
(Ahuja, et al., 2012).  
In line with this approach, which focuses the attention on individuals and agency, there is 
a growing theory of network failure (Podolny & Page, 1998; Schrank & Whitford, 2011) that 
goes beyond the sole structural approach of the dark side and closer to the idea of network 
imperfections, understanding network failure not only as the absence of network governance. 
Thus the idea is that of looking not only to environmental conditions that render network 
governance desirable, but also to those conditions (social, structural, institutional) that make it 
possible.  
Notwithstanding some differences between the various approaches to the study of inter-
organizational collaborations (embeddedness (M. Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997), studied trust 
and learning-by-monitoring (Susan  Helper, et al., 2000; Sabel, 1996), modularity (Langlois, 
2002; Langlois & Robertson, 1992)), it is possible to identify some complementary traits they 
offer to the analysis of 'what makes a network function'. Inter-organizational relationships are 
shown to be sustained by two social conditions5: trust and competence (Gulati, 1995; Larson, 
                                                
5 We use this and following labels in order to adhere to Schrank and Whitford's (2011) terminology. 
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1992; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Uzzi, 1997). The former refers to "the willingness to accept 
vulnerability based on positive expectations about another’s intentions or behaviors" (McEvily, 
Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003); the latter draws attention to the need for coordinating skills and 
task-specific competencies, both necessary to achieve network-level goals (Provan & Kenis, 
2008). Considering these two dimensions, the main threats to network functioning can be 
identified with ignorance and opportunism, which represent sources of failure in that they can 
influence transactions through the functionality of relationships. As stated by Schrank and 
Whitford (2011) “absent ignorance (i.e. bounded rationality), complete contracting would be 
unproblematic; and absent opportunism (i.e. self-interested behavior with guile), contracts 
would be unnecessary”. Thus, ignorance refers to (honest) competency shortfalls, inability to 
align firms’ strategies, to solve a joint problem mainly due to lack of skills or technical 
capacity; opportunism is defined as the behavior arising when partners do not have trust in and 
loyalty to each other, and in contexts in which norms of reciprocity and good faith do not 
characterize social interactions. In order to develop and make functioning network forms of 
governance, institutions can be created or emerge with the aim of inhibiting opportunism and 
sustaining trust development among members (Hagen & Choe, 1998; Raab, 2002; Rousseau, 
Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998).  
 
                                                                                                                                                     
In particular, the use of social conditions instead of human factors is explained by the authors that, 
following the work by Krippner (2002) and Krippner et al. (2004), argue that "all economic 
activity—and not just network governance—is embedded in social relations, and that social 
relations are more generally shaped by social institutions" (Schrank & Whitford, 2011, p. 156). 
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Micro-processes and network failure 
Theorizing network failure focusing on ignorance and opportunism (and their different 
combinations) as the main causes of partial as well as absolute failures have one important risk, 
recently acknowledged for network theories in general: that of focusing on static social 
structures (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003) overlooking network micro-processes, without the 
appreciation of which "the understanding of network outcome is incomplete and potentially 
flawed" (Ahuja, et al., 2012, p. 434).  
Benefits and advantages, as well as problems and dysfunctionalities, depend on network 
configuration (Grandori & Furnari, 2008, 2013). However, the number of nodes and ties (as 
well as their content) can change over time, modifying the network architecture: what would be 
concluded through "a static analysis may be premature or, at best, transitient" (Ahuja, et al., 
2012, p. 435). 
The consideration of network micro-processes allows to appreciate the potential role of 
individuals actions in affecting the overall network structure and making it function − or not. 
Only adopting a more fine-grained analytical lens and looking at network micro-processes is 
possible to have a complete picture of network imperfections, treating the network "as an 
enabler as well as constrainer, in which actors reproduce their network ties through action or 
modify them, leading to a theoretical blurring of the distinction between macro-structure and 
micro-action." (Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000, p. 653). For instance, network as form of 
governance can be designed to inhibit opportunism and enhance trust and competence 
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contingently on the existence of specific network structures or architectures; however, 
individuals can engage in processes of ties formation and management aimed at changing the 
distribution of benefits and constraints from the network, making the governance form 
underperforming. As highlighted by other scholars, "some deliberate network modifying 
actions by network actors in the present may have consequences for network structure later" 
(Ahuja, et al., 2012, p. 435), and these can be even amplified in inter-firm networks to the 
extent that firms’ actions are driven and influenced by individuals or sub-groups’ movements 
(Whitford & Zirpoli, 2009). As recently highlighted in the literature on network governance, 
the internal organization of firms belonging to a network can substantially influence both their 
ability to develop and sustain inter-organizational relationships, and how formal and informal 
patterns of relationships (intra- and inter-nodes) shape the network’s goals and evolution 
(Susan  Helper, et al., 2000; Whitford & Zirpoli, 2009). The presence of multiple networks 
(Padgett & Powell, 2012) where individuals have multiple roles (i.e. friend at the 'social level', 
director at the 'political level', etc.), stresses even more the importance of focusing on network 
micro-processes in order to have a thorough picture critical for appropriate causal inference. 
The analysis of what individuals actually "do" while they are embedded in multiple networks 
can overcome the risk of making a static (and thus premature or transitient) analysis of network 
outcome and to properly understand causes of network failure. 
In this paper we argue that the literature needs to move toward a dynamic theory of 
network failure, able to appreciate environmental, structural and social conditions as well as 
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micro-processes explaining the patterns towards network failure. Because we knew little about 
network processes and dynamics leading to failure when we began this study, we chose to 
pursue our investigation inductively, relying on a qualitative, interpretive approach. The 
interpretive approach focuses on building an emergent theory from a perspective that "gives 
voice to the interpretations of those living an experience" (Corley & Gioia, 2004, p. 178; Gioia, 
Corley, & Hamilton, 2013) in this case, the experience of a relative failure of a network which 
persists in underperforming. 
 
Methods  
To explore the dynamic relationship between ignorance, opportunism, individuals' 
agency and network failure we conducted an exploratory case study of an underperforming 
network between the world-famous Venice Film Festival (la Biennale organization) and the 
local hospitality system. The network of interrelationships between the Festival organization, 
local hotels (hosting Festival's guests and visitors), and hotels' associations (representing 
hotels) has a long past (the Festival started in 1932), and in a very small city like Venice, 
relationships among actors are highly embedded. Nevertheless, cooperation among network 
members, who share the goal of satisfying their common clients, has always been sporadic, 
difficult and with poor outcomes.  
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Our investigation starts from a formal attempt to improve network performance through a 
better coordination among network members made in the occasion of the 68th Festival, which 
also failed. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, p. 27) underlined that in qualitative research, case 
studies can be sampled “for theoretical reasons, such as revelation of an unusual phenomenon 
[...] and elaboration of the emergent theory”, and this is exactly the spirit with which we 
approached the study of the present case. Starting from this "unusual phenomenon" we then 
reconstructed the history of the network through interviews, documents and archival sources. 
Our unit of analysis were behaviors of individuals acting as agents of organizations, 
responsible for inter-organizational relationships decisions. As Table 1 shows, we build on 
triangulated data coming from a review of the Venice Film Festival (VFF) archives (official 
documents, formal and informal correspondence, reports, etc. from 1967 to 1983), a ten-year 
press review of national and international newspapers and specialized magazines (a total of 
about 600 articles were selected and analyzed), in-depth interviews with key stakeholders 
selected using a combination of fixed-list and snowball sampling (a total of 18 semi-structured 
interviews lasting one hour on average, details of interviewees in Table 2), and ethnographic 
techniques (Van Maanen, 1979) in formal meetings among the stakeholders (2 meetings of 
about 2 hours each, details in Table 3).  
INSERT TABLE 1, 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
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Data Analysis 
As we collected the data, we also inductively analyzed it, adhering closely to the 
guidelines of Gioia's methodology (Gioia, et al., 2013). This methodology presents a new 
approach to grounded theory aimed at reaching qualitative rigor in conducting and presenting 
inductive research. Of particular relevance for our work is the fact that this methodology 
focuses the attention not only on the discover of concepts useful to define constructs relevant 
for new emergent theory, but also on the observation of processes aimed at understanding 
dynamics.  
We started our analysis by identifying initial concepts in the data (open coding). With the 
progress of data coding, we started searching similarities in order to reduce the number of 
emerging categories. In this first phase we used in-vivo codes (Strauss, 1987) in order to 
adhere faithfully to informant terms whenever possible, or a short descriptive phrase when an 
in-vivo code was not available. Then we started the second-order analysis, confronting our 
first-order codes with researcher-centric concepts, themes, and dimensions. In this second 
phase we gathered similar codes into several overarching dimensions, that we confronted with 
those of our theoretical background in order to find whether they had adequate theoretical 
referents in the existing literature. The final data structure (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Gioia, et al., 
2013) is illustrated in table 4, which summarizes the second-order themes on which we base 
our development of a dynamic theory of network failure and that is discussed below. 
 
  15 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
The failing network 
 
The Biennale organization (Venice Film Festival − VFF) and the local hospitality system 
(HS) in the city of Venice constitute our network. The VFF is the cinema department of one of 
the most old and prestigious cultural institutions in Venice. Its managing director is in charge 
of the whole organization (but for the artistic direction, for which there is an artistic director). 
The hospitality system (HS) is composed by more than 400 hotels, grouped in three different 
business associations, pseudonymously dubbed Association 1, Association 2 and Association 
3.  
We conceptualize this network as a system of multiple networks, and in particular we 
observed two levels of interaction (domains) which were the playground of the formal attempt 
to govern the network on the occasion of the 68th Festival: the political and economic domains. 
In Padgett and Powell's (2012) terms, the political domain is where "deals are made among 
factions within the state", and the economic domain is where "goods are produced and 
exchanged among companies". Thus, in our empirical setting, the political domain represents 
the formal meetings organized between the directors of the associations and the director of the 
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VFF to define some agreed lines of cooperation between the VFF and the HS. The economic 
domain is where the overall cultural tourism experience for the VFF's visitors/ HS clients is 
produced (accommodation, restaurants, transport services, projections, etc.).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The interdependencies between the VFF and the hospitality system, which press network 
members to make a formal attempt to govern the network, can be traced back to the tourism 
product (experience) they are contributing to offer, identifiable with the “visit to the Venice 
Film Festival”. Research on tourism destination management highlighted how network 
governance would be so suitable in the first place, given the numerous interdependencies 
existing among tourism organizations: “From its long chain of distribution system to its 
fragmented supply components, the tourism field is, by its very nature, dependent upon inter-
organizational relations to achieve organizational and regional goals” (Selin & Beason, 1991). 
Resource dependencies and complementarities typically characterize the complex tourism 
product, which is made up of many different pieces of the tourism experience puzzle, and 
typically controlled or owned by different firms (hospitality, cultural events, transportation, 
etc.). From this structural dependence comes the acknowledgment of the importance of 
network forms of organization for achieving strategic leverage (Pavlovich, 2003; Ritchie & 
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Crouch, 2003), in terms of firms’ innovation (Sundbo, Orfila-Sintes, & Sørensen, 2007) and 
destination marketing (Heath & Wall, 1992).  
In our setting, the VFF and HS can be defined as complements (Milgrom & Roberts, 
1995; Siggelkow, 2001): the cultural experience, represented at its core by the Festival, is 
completed and sustained in the first place by the hospitality system, as well as by all the 
complementary services its visitors require (transportation, restaurants, etc.). On the other side, 
the presence of such an important event in the city of Venice puts the hospitality system under 
a pressure of incomings and media coverage that would not exist were it not for the Festival, 
making the cultural event an important complement to its offer. 
But the pressure of incomings under which the HS is put by an event like a Festival arises 
also a series of concerns for hotels, which have to face the organizational complexities arising 
from unstable demand. Hotels, in fact, have to deal with a massive influx of atypical guests 
once a year, who require specific services such as very flexible meals time, rapid laundry 
service, flexible (thus, private) transport services, rapid and stable internet connection, and so 
on. The investments (hiring personnel, acquiring services, etc.) required to satisfy VFF's 
visitors would lie idle the rest of the year, at least for the greatest part of hotels that cannot 
count on a more stable business/high-quality tourism demand.  
 
The network failure 
  18 
As anticipated in the methods section, our investigation started with the observation of a 
failed attempt to govern the network, on the occasion of the 68th VFF. About five months 
before the event, two meetings were organized between the directors of the associations and 
the VFF director, hosted by the local administration as a neutral ground for interactions (the 
authors of the present work participated as invited external observers). The main goal of the 
meetings was to improve the satisfaction of their clients, since on the bases of past experience 
all participants were aware of the poor performance the destination was giving as a whole. In 
particular, the identified weaknesses were: the scarce quality of accommodation services, often 
compared with high fares applied; the low level of the VFF's information sharing, and in 
particular the scarce timeliness on information diffusion; the poor integration among all the 
components of the visitors' experience (festival, accommodation, transportation, entertainment, 
information). In order to solve the collectively identified priorities, all participants agreed on a 
common program of shared activities in order to offer some of the basic services requested by 
the Festival’s visitors, such as late breakfast and dinner in the hotels, fast and free Internet 
wireless connection, an information desk complete with all the material provided by the VFF, a 
TV tuned on the VFF channel, etc. Although the meetings were concluded with the ample 
agreement on the common program, eventually only a few firms of the HS were willing to 
follow their associations' indications about collaborative activities to pursue, resulting in a 
scattered –and thus less effective – collaborative system.  
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In our reconstruction of the story of the network, evidence of its persistence in 
underperforming due to a lack of coordination is evident. Among all, we think that an article 
published on Variety (the top specialist magazine for the movie industry and film festivals) in 
2002 can be taken as the most explicative, since it points directly to the core of the problem: 
“[...] Shouldn’t the oldest and arguably most prestigious film festival in the world be running 
like a well-oiled machine at this point – even though it’s in Italy? To be blunt, it’s not. From an 
organizational point of view, it’s a creaky mass of disconnected parts. [...]The fest has no real 
center, and there’s no linkage between press operations, hospitality, programming, protocol 
and the grossly overpriced and under-accommodating hotels on the Lido.” 
In the following sections we provide a detailed account of our explanation of network 
failure, presenting the aggregate dimensions emerged from our analysis. 
 
The static dimension of failure 
Very in line with existing literature, in our investigation of causes for network failure 
emerged two aggregate dimensions: (1) ignorance and (2) opportunism. In our interviewees' 
reports of recent facts and past of the network, as well as in the analyzed documentation, we 
found evidence that these two constructs were actually part of the explanation of the network 
underperformance (see Table 4 above).  
Ignorance. The second-order themes which emerged from our data are (i) scarce or 
wrong information and (ii) lack of competence. One of the elements preventing the functioning 
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of network governance is the lack of salient information about others’ resources or 
competencies, as well as the wrong information about potential returns from collaborations. 
From our data emerges how some members of the network did not know on the one side, how 
cooperation could be developed (imagining, for example, that the VFF would ask important 
investments or services out of hotels' competences), and on the other, which would be the 
potential benefits from a systemic coordination (see table 5 for representative quotations). The 
second theme emerging from our data is the lack of competence necessary to develop inter-
organizational relationships between the VFF and the HS. In particular, network members (as 
well as external observers) acknowledged objective difficulties in offering high-quality 
accommodation services, arising from the fact that they are required only for ten days a year 
and that most of the hotels cannot develop internal resources and competences able to satisfy 
such standards. On the other side, lack of competence emerged also as characterized by the 
poor ability of network members to manage inter-organizational collaboration and to frame 
them within the overall business strategy (see Table 5 for representative quotations).  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
  
Opportunism. The aggregate dimension of opportunism is constituted by two second-
order themes: (i) free-riding and (ii) personal interests (see Table 5 for representative 
quotations). Regarding the former, our data show how part of network members adopted free-
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riding behaviors, on the hospitality system side. In fact, the presence of the VFF's visitors on 
the Lido island gives the opportunity to have a massive influx of guest with a high willingness 
to pay: some members of the network simply profit of this situation fixing exaggerated high 
prices without investing in quality of the services offered. Emblematic is the case of 2010, 
when a single Lido hotel charged a journalist 15 euros per day for using internet. Or when, the 
same year, it rained into the room of a small hotel (pensione) charging more than 100 euros per 
night. The second theme of this aggregate dimension regards the pursuing of personal interests, 
with no regard for the network as a whole. Our evidence highlights how part of the network is 
focused only on running its own businesses, mainly adopting a short-term point of view, and 
disregarding the opportunities offered by the network governance (and the threats coming from 
the lack thereof).  
Notwithstanding ignorance and opportunism certainly are part of our story, our evidence 
shows that they cannot explain of all it. Levels of ignorance and opportunism, in fact, were 
somehow limited to few examples, and the most important thing was that they did not concern 
directors of associations and VFF, who were the people in charge to represent the network as a 
whole in the coordination process. 
Directors showed their competence about inter-organizational collaborations in 
discussing the benefits of cooperation between the VFF and the HS:  
“All the associations have to participate, [...] the system must have a positive 
relationship, proactive and elastic.” (Association 3 − director)  
  22 
“When there is an international event like this, we cannot present ourselves as a village 
festival. We cannot set up attractive initiatives as individual entrepreneurs, and without having 
central coordination: if that is lacking, we will lack style. [...] When there are important events 
like this, we have to share the same direction”. (Association 1 − director).  
Moreover, HS and VFF demonstrated a significant level of reciprocal trust:  
“The VFF has always shown itself willing to discuss and to find the most important 
points for collaborating with the Lido island” (Association 3 − director). 
“It has to be said that the VFF has never made any big demands, they never asked for 
anything but they did a lot for the city” (Association 2 − director). 
“We have always had a dialogue (with the Associations, Ed.), a dialogue which still 
continues. There might be some individual cases of operators who decided to cooperate in 
some years, and some others who did not.” (VFF manager). 
“The most strategic aspect is that of a 360-degree collaboration because we are 
extremely willing to cooperate with the VFF and with the Biennale organization in general” 
(Association 1 − director). 
This general collaborative approach was demonstrated also during the meetings, when 
the agreement about which collaborative actions undertake was reached after a collective 
discussion, which ruled out those issues considered by all participants the most thorny ones – 
such as that of special rates for rooms of VFF’s guests. Thus, the proposal for collaborative 
inter-relationships was built in a way that was considered the easiest to accept by all hotels, a 
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kind of middle ground that could convince all. What happened next, was that each 
association’s director could not persuade other members to cooperate with the VFF on the 
collectively designated lines, at least in a comprehensive and systemic way.  
Our results show that the most relevant dimension in explaining the case of this 
underperforming network lies in its micro-processes, that we present in the next section. 
 
The dynamic dimension of failure 
Starting from the evidence coming from the 68th Festival, we could observe directly the 
micro-processes developed by network members during their development, and from this 
observations the two aggregate dimensions (1) framing and (2) mobilizing emerged.  
Framing. Our data show that within each association, different visions about cooperative 
relationships with the VFF were present. More precisely, different ways of (i) interpreting the 
problem and (ii) finding the solutions to it, emerged as characterizing the system (see table 6 
for representative quotations). The interpretation of the situation, together with the focus on 
different priorities in finding solutions, describe the presence of different frames within the HS. 
Hotel managers and association directors have diverse ways of framing the direction the 
network should take and about what kind of solutions would be appropriate.  
In particular, from the analysis of first-order concepts emerge two distinct ways of 
framing the solution of the coordination problem with the VFF: on the one side, there are the 
supporters of a “market” solution, providing formal agreements on commercial issues and 
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formalizing contracts of exclusivity as a concrete sign of commitment by the VFF; on the other 
side, it is the idea of “network” cooperation as the best form of interaction, under which lies 
the belief that the VFF is a kind of “public good” from which the entire HS (and the whole city 
itself) benefit, and thus all firms have to commit themselves towards high standards of quality, 
widespread communication of the event and specifically arranged services. We mapped the 
major differences in the interpretation of the environment, and in its translation into 
coordination attitudes, according to five elements. The first two, pertaining the interpretation of 
the problem, are (i) how actors generally interpret the relationship between the VFF and the 
HS and (ii) how the mutual interdependence unbalances the bargaining power. The other three 
elements, describing the possible solutions to the coordination problem, are: (iii) the 
expectations about the partner’s actual collaborative choices, (iv) the incentives that would 
sustain interactions, and, finally, (v) the possible coordination mechanisms useful to govern the 
network. 
Agents showing an interpretation of the environment akin to the first frame (close to an 
interpretation of adversarial/contractual coordination), talk about a power relation between the 
VFF and HS in which the latter keeps most of the force since the interdependence is interpreted 
as being more unbalanced in its favor. That is to say, the HS can live without the VFF, but the 
reverse is not true. From this point of view, they expect the relationship to be built on explicit 
and specific criteria, in order to satisfy the requirements of the HS. Possible incentives to 
develop a collaborative agreement, with consequent required innovation efforts on both sides, 
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would be the assurance of exclusivity of benefits coming from collaborations –typically, image 
returns – against potential free-riders. Consequently, the best coordination arrangement would 
be an exclusive formal (and mid-term) agreement between the parties, where the interlocutor 
for the HS is identified in most of the cases with the association.  
The second way of framing network governance (close to an interpretation of 
cooperative/informal coordination) is proposed by those agents talking about a balanced 
relationship between the HS and VFF, or even more frequently, about the gratitude of the HS 
towards the VFF for its widespread economic returns that benefit the whole city of Venice. The 
interdependency relation, from their point of view, is unbalanced in favor of the VFF, since a 
significant part of the annual revenues of the HS depends on the event. For an effective 
cooperative relationship, they would expect to work together with the VFF organization, in 
order to mutually take into account specific needs and demands: thus, their incentives to 
embark on a cooperative agreement would be to be sure of the reciprocal willingness to build 
coordinated actions and to be addressed towards the most relevant and profitable ways of 
innovation. Consequently, the optimal form of coordination is identified with a more social 
form of exchange of information, ideas, and long-term vision.  
Table 7 shows the specific traits of the two frames, both present not only among different 
associations, but also within the same organization6. 
                                                
6 The use of these labels for the two frames derives from the classic split in governance between an 
“exit” vs. a “voice” approach (Hirschman, 1971), than re-interpreted to fit the specific case of 
network governance and re-named by the literature as “adversarial” vs. “cooperative”, where the 
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INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Mobilizing. The contextual presence of two different ways of framing network 
governance started a process of mobilization, in which network members strategically acted to 
mobilize others towards their own interpretation of the context, and then towards their 
"solution". In particular, two themes emerged from our data: (i) coalition building and (ii) 
involving and convincing processes. Dynamics of coalition building emerged from the 
narratives of network members, which told us how they tried to join efforts and resources with 
other network members in order to pursue common goals. The recurrent pattern showed by 
data is the transversal (with respect to associations) interaction among agents with similar 
frames, that try to act in their interest either signing agreements with the VFF outside 
institutional lines, or boycotting them. Thus the micro-process is constituted by a dynamic of 
groups formation, often developed on the social domain of the network, and by the process of 
involving other members in coalitional projects, convincing them about a specific way of 
framing the situation.  
 Triangulated evidence in the press review (such as the official claims of network 
members) and interviews mention different interests that are promoted in the shadows of the 
                                                                                                                                                     
former adversarial/exit- corresponds to an arm's length contractual relation, and the latter -
cooperative/voice- refers to an obligational contractual relation (see Susan Helper (1990); 
Nishiguchi (1994); Sako (1992)). 
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institutional lines of communication. For example, when asked about the interaction of the 
three associations with the VFF, hotel managers say: 
 “We (hotels belonging to different associations, Ed.) have a different problem, thus we 
need different solutions, but with respect to other issues, maybe we have the same interests.”  
“For example, Mr. Trader and I (belonging to different associations, Ed.) share the same 
problems, we know each other, we ring each other to discuss all sorts of issues, we 
collaborate.” 
Thus micro-processes were developed mostly across formal organizational boundaries of 
associations: in the next section we present which role they had in influencing what was 
happening behind the curtains.  
 
The Role of Institutions 
The role of institutions emerged significantly during our data analysis: associations were 
the institutions supposed to be in charge of sustaining and promote cooperation and network 
governance. They were the representatives for the whole HS in charge of defining common 
terms of cooperation with the VFF, with the subsequent task of mobilizing their members 
towards the agreed interpretation of the network coordination. However, associations were not 
able to accomplish their task, leaving mobilizing dynamics to individuals' initiatives. Two main 
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themes emerged as constituent the role of institutions in both the static and dynamic dimension 
of network failure: (i) representativeness and (ii) building a shared vision.  
Our data identify associations' lack of representativeness as one of the weaknesses of the 
network, in their inability to represent a reference point for network coordination. “In the last 
few years we have been trying to pursue with particular care a series of relationships as 
continuous and coordinated as possible with the hospitality system. In doing this, we are not 
supported by the local system that, unlike other cities – and unlike other international festivals, 
such as Cannes, for example – does not have category associations that are representative, 
unique, and coordinated. Actually, there is still a profound split. There are many different hotel 
associations, not all representative of the reality of the hotels. This is a first element of 
important difficulty.” (VFF’s director) 
“All the hotels belong to different associations, and it’s impossible to have a single 
interlocutor.” (VFF’s manager) 
“I believe it is not wrong to highlight the lack of representative associations: this would 
result in better dialogue with the institutions – such as the Biennale –, in a higher quality of 
service, in easier communication, in more uniform general standards and thus would make it 
easier to communicate also to customers.” (Hotel G’s manager) 
“They (HS, Ed.) even talk about the will to build other associations. It would be a big 
mistake, because [...] they would only weaken the system, and it would be a war among the 
weak instead of a war among the strong.” (Local Administrator) 
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The problem of representativeness is linked both to the size of associations (clearly 
because there are three of them instead of one single representative of the whole HS) and their 
ability to effectively represent their associates’ interests.  
Strongly linked with this first theme is that of building a shared vision among their 
members. Associations were in charge of communicating and mobilizing adherents toward a 
common and shared interpretation of network coordination, to be substantiated in cooperative 
actions within the collectively designated lines. The process of mobilizing associations’ 
members towards that specific frame of collective collaboration with the VFF, failed. 
Association directors explain the facts as follows:  
“If you ask them (association’s members, Ed.) something, it is not something they are 
forced to do. Why should they agree with you[...]? ” (Association 2 − director) 
“It often happens that the director comes to the meetings – roundtables for specific 
initiatives – and then the communication [within the association] isn’t.. isn’t really positive. So 
someone, maybe the “dead wood”, doesn’t agree with the conclusions or the choices made by 
the association, and doesn’t follow the guidelines, damaging the whole group.” (Association 3 
− director) 
What was needed, within each association, was a process aimed at building a shared 
vision about the systemic cooperation with the VFF, namely to link different members’ 
interests and interpretative frames, mobilizing adherents towards a common interpretation and 
solution to the problem. Associations emerged to be unaware both of the existence of two 
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competing frames and of the coalition building dynamics. Having missed these important 
micro-processes, they were not able to identify the necessity to start a serious process of 
framing alignment, thus leaving the network persisting in underperformance.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Overall, our study analyzes the underperforming network constituted by the VFF and the 
local hospitality system starting from the observation of a formal attempt to govern the network 
on the occasion of the 68th Festival. Our results made emerge both a static and dynamic 
dimensions of failure, and highlighted the role of institutions in the pattern towards failure. 
As figure 2 shows, four distinct causes of network failure emerged: ignorance and 
opportunism, within the static dimension; framing and mobilizing, constituting the dynamic 
dimension. In the analysis of micro-processes it emerged how institutions play a role in 
influencing their impact on network failure.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Our results show that the network between VFF and HS was characterized by a level of 
ignorance and opportunism that, by itself, could not explain the failure to guide the network 
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towards a systemic collaboration, even if they were certainly part of the explanation. In this 
context, institutions were partially able to inhibit some opportunistic behaviors and to enhance 
members' competence about collaborations with the VFF, through a mutual exchange of 
information with the VFF. 
However, the observation of micro-processes highlighted that the two frames about the 
mode of coordination to activate between the VFF and the HS (Adversarial and Cooperative, 
see Table 7 above) were not congruent within associations, namely were both present at the 
same time within each institution. As claimed by Kaplan (2008), when this happens, we are 
facing a framing contest, and actors may engage “in highly political framing practices to make 
their frames resonate and to mobilize action in their favor” (Kaplan, 2008, p. 729). Our 
investigation highlighted that individuals were engaging in framing and mobilizing practices 
outside the formal organizational boundaries, and these processes developed at the individual 
level undermined the associations’ efforts to build a systemic collaboration with the festival. 
Mobilizing practices, aimed at sustaining one frame or the other, followed “patterns of 
mobilization distinct from both lines of formal authority and the personal ties of informal 
organization” (Clemens, 2005, p. 356), thus crossing institutional boundaries. 
The representation of actors embedded in multiple networks help us to describe these 
micro-processes, and to highlight how different domains are connected. The mobilizing 
dynamic is represented in figure 3: relational and social exchange take place outside formal 
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organizational boundaries and lines of communication, and political coalitions form around a 
shared way of framing the situation. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Associations’ directors, namely decision-makers for what concerns the institutional 
communication and for the formalization of collective agreements for a network form of 
governance with the VFF at the political level, are also in charge of mobilizing adherents at the 
economic level towards a common interpretation and solution to the problem. Nevertheless, 
political coalitions acting behind the scenes of institutional lines of communication and 
interactions, led to an ineffective process of mobilization within each association towards a 
common idea of cooperation with the VFF. Associations, in fact, did not acknowledge nor the 
presence of two competing frames, neither the micro-processes of mobilization and coalition 
building developed by individuals. Not intervening on the framing contest, cooperation was left 
in the hands of individual initiatives despite the already designed collaborative path, due to the 
impossibility of mobilizing hotels towards a collectively shared solution. 
 
 
Towards a dynamic theory of network failure 
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Recent developments in theories of network governance have stressed the need to shift to 
a more dynamic approach to the study of networks, able to give a more comprehensive view 
and deeper insights into their dynamics – looking at the interplay between institutional, inter-
firm and intra-organizational behaviors (Ahuja, et al., 2012; Honig & Lampel, 2000; Human & 
Provan, 2000; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007; Smith-Doerr & Powell, 2005). In this paper we 
argued that the same shift is necessary also for the new stream of research investigating 
network failure focusing on network imperfections, proposing a dynamic theory of network 
failure.  
Through the observation of micro-processes it is possible to understand how individuals' 
actions change network architecture over time, having a complete picture of its imperfections: 
the static analysis of networks, in fact, offers only a contingent and partial appreciation of its 
dysfunctionalities, while a dynamic view allows to connect the macro-structure with micro-
action.  
With this study we contribute to the open call about bringing back individuals in network 
studies, in fact "most of our theorizing often suggests a curiously static and passive approach 
on the part of these actors with respect to the network itself" (Ahuja, et al., 2012, p. 442). But 
the emergence of network architectures from micro-processes may create the conditions that 
subsequently influence network evolution, thus influencing the eventual path toward failure.  
In our theorizing process, we found that the static dimension was not sufficient to explain 
network failure, and that the theory must be complemented by a dynamic dimension, looking at 
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micro-processes connecting individual agency to changes in network architecture and 
configuration. In particular, it emerged how the presence of two competing frames about 
network coordination started micro-processes of mobilization and coalition building, affecting 
the network architecture. The underlying assumption of this reasoning is a political conception 
of interests, as opposed to a structural one: organizational boundaries are not representative of 
consistency or cohesiveness of interests and needs, and thus, for example, they are not 
sufficient to infer the position of an organization only because it belongs to a specific 
association. This approach is against the structural determinism, suffered by many network 
analyses (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994), and in line with sociological theories of social 
movements, that “avoid the problems of structural determinism by emphasizing the actions of 
those with relatively little power initially who band together in groups and organizations to 
increase their leverage, sometimes while facing opposition, in order to engage in strategies to 
accomplish goals” (Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000, pp. 653-654).  
Social movements research can support the development of the theory of network failure 
in two different ways: (i) from the individuals' perspective, can highlight the link between their 
actions and positions, and whether they face opposition in the network, and whether the 
political environment is favorable to their position or not (Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000); (ii) 
from a network perspective, it can shed light on how collective actors emerge as the result of 
coalitions and purposively built ties (Diani, 2011). 
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From the first point of view, the unit of analysis are cognitive frames, defined as 
“schemata of interpretation” (Goffman, 1986) which allow actors to make sense of uncertain 
contexts. Frames shape how individuals see the world, their preferences and perceptions of 
their own interests. In strategy-making processes cognitive frames influence managers’ 
interpretation of the outside world on the basis of which they will direct organizational action. 
Political concerns arise when environmental conditions create opportunities for some actors to 
purposefully attempt to impose their frames on the others.  
Thus from the second point of view, the process of mobilizing in order to "shape the 
frames of the others" (Diani, 1996, 2011; Diani & Bison, 2004) focuses on the process through 
which collective actors may emerge as the result of a purposeful process of ties formation. 
Through the "frame alignment processes" (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986) 
coalitions group around powerful frames (Diani, 1996).  
Our dynamic theory of network failure is based on these two main pillars: (i) the role of 
individual agency in affecting network architecture; (ii) the importance to focus on micro-
processes to explain actual network imperfections. In this study we demonstrated how agency 
and agency-in-action need both to be taken into consideration to explain why some networks 
persist in underperforming. As stated by pragmatists, understanding not only ‘what is done’, 
but also ‘how it is done’ (introducing the temporal dimension), requires close anthropological 
attention (De Certeau, 1984; Whittington, 2006).  
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Concluding remarks 
In this work we told a story about a network persisting in underperformance, between the 
Venice Film Festival organization and its local hospitality system. Understanding the actual 
causes of the presence of the failing network contributes both to the still underdeveloped theory 
of network failure, and to the scant empirical research in this field. The theory of network 
failure, in fact, has suffered from a lack of attention by sociologists and organizational 
scholars, who focused more on network functionalities than on its problems or failures (Diani, 
2011; Podolny & Page, 1998). On the other side, there is still very little empirical evidence of 
network failures given the specific difficulties related to data gathering (Miles & Snow, 1992; 
Schrank & Whitford, 2011).  
Besides methodological and theoretical implications, our study provides some practical 
implications. The identification of two different approaches and “schemata of interpretation” 
for the cooperation problem sheds some light on possible actions to tackle network failure. At 
the macro level, pointing out that institutions were not necessarily able to mobilize resources 
and actors’ behaviors, might suggest alternative coordination policy: the typical formal 
“orchestration” of actors’ initiatives led by local public and private authorities had little 
effectiveness due to a substantial difficulty in mobilizing agents that adhere to different frames. 
Such authorities would benefit from Kaplan’s (2008) indication to focus more attention on 
framing practices. Moreover, the identification, case by case, of the framing contest at stake, 
suggests how to fine tune the aforementioned orchestration.  
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Although case analysis is certainly the most suitable method to answer our exploratory 
research question, we acknowledge that our results have some important boundary conditions. 
We analyzed a case of a network based on geographical proximity, with several lock-in effects 
for participants and path dependency. Moreover, the subjects we analyzed belong to 
heterogeneous institutions and organizations (Associations, firms, cultural organizations, etc.) 
with different internal governance structures. Notwithstanding these limitations, we used the 
case as for the elaboration of emergent theory (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) without putting 
forward any claim of generalizability of our results.  
The enhancement of the theory we proposed with this work contributes to the lack of 
attention to agency and micro-processes that has been long lamented in network research 
(Ahuja, et al., 2012). Moreover, with this work, we found a possible field of integration 
between organization studies and social movements research (Campbell, 2005; Clemens, 
2005). In particular, there are strong similarities in the mechanisms by which organizations and 
social movements evolve and develop (Campbell, 2005). As noted by Soule (2012), sometimes 
organizations act like social movements, and thus organization studies could profit from the 
well-developed body of work which deal with their origins and mechanisms of change. Still 
few studies focused on the convergence between networks and social movements, even there 
are some notable exceptions (Diani & McAdam, 2003; Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000). In this 
paper we showed how constructs − such as cognitive frames and mobilizing practices − 
originated within the social movements stream of research help explaining the micro-processes 
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of network evolution, thus pushing further the theory of network failure through the 
consideration of the interplay between individual agency and network architecture.  
Although our work contributes to the further development of the theory of network 
failure, much work has still to be done. In particular, future research could be developed in the 
exploration of failure in different institutional settings, in order to identify potential links 
between the institutional context and the development of cross-organizational coalitions. 
Moreover, further work could be developed in the network performance domain, particularly in 
the analysis of the connection between mobilizing practices and underperforming networks. 
Notwithstanding the importance of other theoretical contributions for the development of a 
theory of network failure, we are convinced that this field particularly needs more empirical 
work that will allow also to develop the methodological approach to the study of network 
failures.
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
 Sources Description 
 Internal  
Interviews  
18, 18h10min Interviews were held in February-May 2011. All the key-stakeholders of the macro-system 
were interviewed at least once. The majority of interviewees had occupied their position at least 
for 10 years, thus being able to provide an historical perspective of the situation. All interviews 
were recorded and transcribed. 
Ethnography  
2, 3h15min The two meetings to which the authors were invited as external observers were held in March 
and April 2011. The meetings were hosted by the Lido Municipality. The meetings were 
recorded and transcribed, and notes were taken about participants’ behaviors.  
External  
National Press  
2001-2011 All articles of the VFF national press review were analyzed. Articles about the relationships 
between the VFF and the HS were selected. For 11 years of press reviews, from the more than 
5000 articles available, around 600 articles have been analyzed. 
Observers Articles containing opinions of third parties, external to the macro-systems, were classified as 
“observers”. Evidence of the system’s performance and perception of relationships is provided 
by this type of article. 
Macro-system Articles reporting interviews or official declarations of the macro-system’s members were 
classified as “macro-system”. This evidence was mainly used to reconstruct the history of the 
last 11 years and to triangulate evidence from Internal sources. 
International Press  
2001-2011 All articles of the VFF international press review were analyzed. Articles about the VFF 
performance, the HS performance, and their links, have been selected. For 11 years of press 
review, around 50 articles have been analyzed. Evidence of relationships’ success or failure was 
found, as well results about decrease or increase in value due to collaboration. 
VFF Archival Data  
1967-1983 Data accessible from the VFF archives regard all official documents collected for each 
festival’s organization. Contracts, applications, movies’ papers, meetings’ transcripts, official 
correspondence, etc. are available. Documents after 1983 are subject to restricted access. Data 
regarding official correspondence between the VFF and HS were analyzed, aiming at 
reconstructing the past history of their interrelationships. 
Table 1: List of sources and brief description 
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 Interviewees # Duration 
 Venice Film Festival   
Managerial Director 1 1h 
Marketing Director 3 3h30min 
Press Manager 1 1h10min 
 Local Government   
Tourism and Culture Counselor - City of Venice 1 1h 
Vice-president - Lido Municipality 3 2h30min 
Tourism and Culture Counselor - Lido 
Municipality 
3 2h 
 Hospitality System   
Ass.1 Director - Venice 1 1h 
Ass.1 Director - Lido 1 1h15min 
Ass.2 Director 1 1h 
Ass.3 Director 1 1h 
Hotel Manager 1 1 1h30min 
Hotel Manager 2 1 1h15min 
 Tot. 18 18h10min 
Table 2: List and duration of interviews 
 
 
 Organizers Participants Duration 
1. Lido Municipality Hospitality System 1h 30min 
 Vice-president Ass. 1 Director - Lido  
 Tourism and Culture Counselor Ass. 2 Director  
  Ass. 3 Director  
  Hotel Manager 1  
2. Lido Municipality Hospitality System 1h 45min 
 Vice-president Ass. 1 Director - Lido  
 Tourism and Culture Counselor Ass. 2 Director  
  Ass. 3 Director  
  Hotel Manager 1  
  Venice Film Festival  
  Managerial Director  
Table 3: List of participants and duration of observed meetings 
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Table 4: Data structure. 
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Themes Representative Quotations 
 
Ignorance 
Lack of Competence “If I am not pursuing high quality standards throughout the year, and in two days I try 
to improvise, I will be at the risk of damage by giving the wrong image: it is not a 
question of price, it is a value concern.” 
 “There is delay in developing common strategic-thinking, as far as team-building and 
presentation as a group are concerned.” 
Scarce/Wrong 
Information 
“The VFF lasts only two weeks. At the end, it does not have such significant returns for 
the HS.” 
 “Sometimes I have to ask my colleagues: which association does this hotel belong to? 
Because I do not know. I know that symbols and, associations’ names change, and I 
lose track of which association they belong.” 
 “When do we know what the movies are? Which stars are coming? Is it possible to 
know everything only one month before the Festival, or should we know well in 
advance, say, 6 months before? ” 
 Opportunism 
Free-riding “I see things, more important, such as price increases, sometimes really exaggerated 
with respect to the others. Or sometimes the quality of rooms, which would need to be 
refurbished.” 
“Grossly overpriced and under-accommodating hotels on the Lido. ” 
Personal interests “They are so focused on their personal priorities that they cannot follow the overall 
picture of development.” 
“Everyone looks only at their own personal interests, never looking at the whole 
system.” 
Table 5: Data supporting interpretation of a the static dimension of failure. 
 
 
 
Themes Representative Quotations 
 
Framing 
Interpreting “Everyone is aware that the rules have to be changed, it is necessary to work in another 
way. But there is still no agreement on how they should be changed.” 
“I had some difficulties in discussing some particular issues (within the association, 
Ed.), the confrontation at the meetings was problematic. [...] We have very different 
problems.” 
 “Maybe since it has always been this way, some colleagues do not agree, because for 
historical reasons they expect a lot and are not willing to give much, for this event.” 
Finding solutions “Other colleagues and I that interpret the situation in the same way, we think that it is 
necessary to give something more, to yield more. The moment is difficult, and also the 
other counterpart is willing to cooperate.” 
 “We need to focus on the commercial aspects: we developed a framework defining 
possible collaborative actions. A program not for only one year, but at least biennial. It 
is a way of saying: ’do not always run after macro-negotiations, but let’s work on a 
medium-term program’.” 
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 Mobilizing 
Coalition building “There was a firm that did not want to participate in the initiative, that in my opinion 
was trivial. But maybe, from their point of view, it was meaningless. They answered 
negatively, so I asked another firm from a different association and we did it together.” 
“So someone, maybe the “dead wood”, doesn’t agree with the conclusions or the 
choices made by the association, and doesn’t follow the guidelines, damaging the 
whole group.” 
“They want to create a sort of division, for their personal interests. It is unbelievable, 
but we cannot work all together.” 
Involving/ Convincing “It is clear that we have to work following this path, but it is not easy to change the 
mentality of persons who have worked in this field, with this kind of event, for years. 
They have never felt involved, so they are not easy to convince.” 
“We have our channels, through which we can tell our associates: ‘look, we are going 
to do this operation, you have to charge this rate, and so on’.” 
“In this respect, we are trying to build a mechanism for pushing not only individuals’ 
activities, but those of the whole council, and this is an important thing.” 
Table 6: Data supporting interpretation of a the dynamic dimension of failure. 
 
 
 
 
 Frame 1:  Frame 2:  
 Adversarial (exit) Cooperative (voice) 
 Relationship “The VFF strongly needs the HS. Thus they have to 
look for a positive relationship with local hotels.” 
“In my opinion, in agreement with other 
colleagues, it is necessary for the HS give 
something more, yield more. The VFF has always 
contributed significantly, and now the problems are 
the same for everyone.” 
Interdependence “The aim is clear: we (association) commit 
ourselves to giving you what you cannot get from 
single hotels, and you (VFF), in turn, acknowledge 
our presence, both in operational and image terms.” 
“Thus there is, there exists, a positive relationship, 
since the VFF attracts every year hundreds and 
thousands of people— tourists, professionals, 
journalists— to Venice.” 
Expectations “the VFF has to commit itself to managing this 
relationship following specific criteria, starting 
from the vexata quaestio of the payment terms.” 
“If the attractive elements of the Festival are 
distributed over an extended period, if the average 
duration of stay is longer thanks to a more 
interesting program, surely the HS will be happy to 
collaborate on several issues, knowing that the VFF 
has to pay attention to costs and resources.” 
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Incentives “It is absolutely clear that the VFF has to make an 
effort, namely to acknowledge a single interlocutor, 
because otherwise the association cannot make 
other efforts, especially economic ones. If there is a 
project to finance, aimed at increasing hotel quality 
for example, we can invest, but in turn the VFF has 
to give something back, the recognition of our 
association as the sole institutional partner for 
accommodation services.” 
“For this reason we need to be coordinated: we not 
only have to collaborate, but we also have to decide 
together which services are really necessary. 
Because sometimes there are some things that are 
really essential, but we cannot expect economic 
returns from them.” 
Coordination “Let’s not always pursue micro-negotiations, but 
let’s work on a contractual medium-term program.” 
“The VFF should discuss with the associations 
what its goals and its values are, sharing the 
potential ways along which we can pursue them.” 
!
Table 7: List of main traits of the two ways of framing the network governance. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Network conceptualization. 
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Figure 2: Dynamic theory of network failure. 
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Figure 3: Political coalition development 
 
 
